This article presents a self-presentation approach to the study of social anxiety that proposes that social anxiety arises when people are motivated to make a preferred impression on real or imagined audiences but doubt they will do so, and thus perceive or imagine unsatisfactory evaluative reactions from subjectively important audiences. We presume that specific situational and dispositional antecedents of social anxiety operate by influencing people's motivation to impress others and their expectations of satisfactorily doing so. In contrast to drive models of anxiety but consistent with social learning theory, it is argued that the cognitive state of the individual mediates both affective arousal and behavior. The traditional inverted-U relation between anxiety and performance is reexamined in this light. Implications of the approach for counseling situations are considered, especially the recommendation that treatments be tailored to the specific type of selfpresentational problem encountered by clients, Social anxiety is a prevalent and occasionally debilitating personal problem even in normal populations (e.g., Bruskin. 1973; Bryant & Trower, 1974; Martinson & Zerface, 1970; Zimbardo, 1977) . Commensurate with an increased awareness of the phenomenon is a growing literature on its causes and treatments, appearing under such labels as social anxiety, shyness, dating anxiety, heterosexual-social anxiety, stagefright, speech anxiety, communication apprehension, reticence, and embarrassment. Despite the quantity of work and the frequency with which counselors see clients with such interpersonal problems, the topic suffers a lack of conceptual integration.
The Concept of Social Anxiety
As a point of departure, it is necessary to ask whether a class of anxieties (a) can be empirically isolated from other anxieties and considered conceptually distinct and (b) has the common property of being social in nature; that is, of being aroused and intensified by other people. Factor analytic studies of fear and anxiety inventories have consistently obtained solutions that include either one (Endler, Hunt, & Rosenstein, 1962; Landy & Gaupp, 1971; Lawlis, 1971; Miller, Barrett, Hampe, & Noble, 1972; Strahan, 1974) or two (Bates, 1971; Bernstein & Allen, 1969; Braun & Reynolds, 1969) factors reflecting socially aroused anxieties. The "social nervousness" factor obtained by Strahan (1974) is representative of those reported in studies finding a single social anxiety factor. It included items such as being introduced to new people, giving a speech, being interviewed for a job, being in a room full of strangers, and dating someone for the first time. A similar social anxiety factor was obtained in a study of children's fears and was denned by items such as making mistakes, being criticized, making another person angry, and reciting in class (Miller et al., 1972) . In studies that found two social anxiety factors, one reflected concerns about certain ordinary social events (e.g., speaking before 641 a group, meeting someone for the first time, being a leader, being with a member of the opposite sex), and the other reflected concerns about social failures and criticism (e.g., looking foolish, being criticized, making mistakes, being misunderstood).
It is not completely clear why some of these studies obtained one and others two social anxiety factors, particularly since most of them used very similar scale item pools and similar factor analytic procedures. It seems that when two factors are obtained they reflect a distinction between (a) being in an evaluative situation where one's behavior is especially scrutinized by others (and might be found lacking) and (b) being in a situation where one's behavior already has been judged as inadequate by others. We will return to this distinction shortly. At any rate, these studies provide evidence that people's ratings of anxiety-producing situations identify an empirically distinguishable class of anxieties that arise in response to social events.
Social anxiety will be defined as anxiety resulting from the prospect or presence of personal evaluation in real or imagined social situations. Anxiety is a cognitive and affective response characterized by apprehension about an impending, potentially negative outcome that one thinks one is unable to avert. The source of the apprehension may be conscious or nonconscious, and the impending threat real or imagined (Lesse, 1970) . Anxiety fluctuates over time and situations, but there are individual differences (produced by personal experience and probably biological factors) in the degree to which people experience it.
By social situations we mean situations in which people are or might become the focus of attention of others, as when they are engaged in a conversation, giving a speech, and so on. Such social interactions carry the prospect of interpersonal evaluation: people making judgments of one another. People can experience social anxiety while imagining social situations as well as when actually in them.
The prospect of interpersonal evaluation and all it entails appears to distinguish social anxiety from other forms of anxiety. In social anxiety, people perceive a low likelihood of obtaining satisfactory evaluations from others. We propose that a perceived inability to deal successfully with the evaluative events inherent in social interaction precipitates social anxiety. In other types of anxiety, as in potentially harmful situations and situations characterized by disruption and disorder (nonsocial anxiety factors found by Strahan, 1974) , concerns about the evaluative actions of others do not precipitate the experience or become its major focus of attention. For example, one might fear walking through a dark city street at night because of the danger of being physically harmed by a mugger. Although one might loosely speak of a "social" encounter with a mugger, the cause of the concern is physical harm, not the evaluation of oneself by the mugger. One's anxiety might be great, but we would not consider this a case of social anxiety.
Situations can include social and nonsocial components. For instance, in the mugger example, some people may be anxious because of both the physical danger and concerns about evaluation by significant others of their competence in dealing with such situations (e.g., being seen as unable to protect oneself or as stupidly placing oneself in danger).
Approaches to Social Anxiety:
Causes and Treatments
The existing literature on social anxiety may be roughly categorized into four major approaches (see Leary, 1982) . The skills deficit model assumes that anxiety experienced in social situations is due to an inadequate or inappropriate repertoire of social skills (Bellack & Hersen, 1979; Curran, 1977) . The resulting mismanagement of social discourse by those with poor social skills produces aversive situations that elicit anxiety, both in the immediate encounter and when future encounters are imagined. Studies have shown that social anxiety is often reduced by helping anxious subjects improve their social skills (e.g., Bander, Steinke, Allen, & Mosher, 1975; Bellack & Hersen, 1979; Cumin, 1977; Curran, Gilbert, & Little, 1976; Twentyman AMcFall, 1975) .
Several investigators have noted that few deficits in important social skills have been identified among socially anxious individu-als, and the mere acquisition of new skills does not always reduce anxiety (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Clark & Arkowitz, 1975) . The cognitive self-evaluation model states that social anxiety results not from an objective skills deficit per se but from the individual's perception of personal inadequacies (Rehm & Marston, 1968) . Indeed, research has shown that socially anxious people tend to underestimate their social skills, rate themselves more negatively, expect to perform more poorly socially, and regard others' reactions to them as less positive even when they are not, than do nonanxious people (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979; Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Gilkinson, 1943; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Smith & Sarason, 1975) . Procedures designed to reduce clients' negative self-evaluations are often effective in reducing social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Kanter & Goldfried, 1979; Meichenbaum, Gilmore, & Fedoravicius, 1971; Rehm & Marston, 1968; Sherman, Mulac, & McCann, 1974) ,
The third approach, a classical conditioning model, assumes that social anxiety is conditioned when neutral stimuli become paired with aversive social consequences (cf. Wolpe, 1973) . The strongest evidence in favor of the classical conditioning approach is that systematic desensitization has been shown to be quite effective in reducing social anxiety, both in children and adults (Bander et al., 1975; Fishman & Nawas, 1973; Kondas, 1967; Mitchell & Orr, 1974) .
Finally, many researchers have adopted a personality trait approach, investigating individual differences in the affective, cognitive, and behavioral concomitants of social anxiety (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1979; Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Crozier, 1979; Leary, in press ). Factor analyses of personality trait items often obtain "social anxiety" factors, suggesting that social anxiousness might be regarded as a major trait (e.g., Cattell, 1973; Crozier, 1979; Layman, 1940) . There is also evidence that shyness has an inherited component (Cattell, 1973) , which suggests that dispositional social anxiousness may have an underpinning in temperament (Buss & Plomin, 1975) .
Although it is generally recognized that each of these four models has some explanatory power, their proponents often treat them as rival hypotheses, and little attempt has been made to examine factors that underlie all cases of social anxiety. In short, what is the lowest common denominator of instances in which people experience social anxiety?
Self-Presentation and Social Anxiety
Through aspects of their appearance and behavior, people intentionally or unintentionally lay claim to particular self-images that comprise their identities. 1 These images are schemas of individuals and have implications for how those individuals are defined and treated by themselves and others (Schlenker, 1980, in press-a, in press-b) . Whenever people are in the presence of others, it is usually in their best interests to convey particular types of impressions (Goffman, 1959; Jones & Pittman, 1982; Jones &Wortman, 1973; Schlenker, 1980,inpressa, in press-b; Tedeschi, 1981) . Some projected images will make a desired impression and result in desired reactions from others; other images will make undesired impressions and generate undesired reactions. Maximizing one's reward/cost ratio in social life involves, in large part, control of the self-images that are projected to others.
The Nature of Self-Presentation
Self-presentation is the attempt to control images of self before real or imagined audiences (Schlenker, 1980, in press-a, in pressb) . It is a goal-directed act designed, at least in part, to generate particular images of self and thereby influence how audiences perceive and treat the actor.
The type of impression an actor would prefer to create must be denned in terms of the actor's other goals and self-beliefs in the particular situation. Usually, people prefer to present themselves in socially desirable ways, such as by appearing reasonably competent, attractive, honest, and so forth. However, a variety of self-presentations and accompanying audience reactions can best serve people's goals in specific situations (Hogan, in press; Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980, in press-a) . As examples, actors may attempt to present themselves in ways that will achieve self-verification, liking, respect, fear, nurturance, or autonomy. The types of impressions people prefer to create depend on what they are trying to achieve and are affected by both personality and situational factors (Hogan, in press; Schlenker, in press-a) .
The perceived, anticipated, or imagined reactions of others to the actor provide feedback about whether the actor has created the desired impression. If others respond in a manner commensurate with the intended impression, the actor has been successful in accomplishing his or her self-presentational goal; if they do not, the actor has been unsuccessful. The importance of the reactions of real or imagined audiences distinguishes self-presentational behavior from other behavior. Although nearly all behavior can reveal information about the actor, not all behavior can be classified as self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980, in press-a) . In self-presentational behavior the actor must have the goal of controlling how audiences perceive the self, which means that the intended reaction of audiences is the criterion for assessing the effectiveness of the behavior.
At the extremes, some behaviors seem to be exclusively self-presentational, and others do not seem to contain any self-presentational component. In the former case, people's only goal is to create a particular impression on others. An example is the employee whose remarks reflect only what he or she thinks the boss wants to hear and not his or her private views. In the latter case, people are unconcerned about projecting particular images of self and the reaction of the audience is irrelevant to their goals. An example is a person who is totally engrossed in performing some intellectual task and oblivious to the presence of others. Between these extremes are cases in which people have several goals, and hence several criteria for determining how well the goals are being accomplished, and one of the goals is to make a particular impression on others. An example is an employee who is trying to accomplish a job-related task, but in a way that impresses the employer. When several goals exist in a situation, the more important the self-presentational goal is to the actor, the greater the actor's concern with the impression-relevant reactions of audiences (Schlenker, in press-a, in press-b) .
Self-presentation does not necessarily involve conscious deception (Schlenker, 1980, in press-a) . In many cases, self-presentation involves bringing actual attributes or accomplishments to the attention of others, perhaps by performing meritorious deeds in their presence and presenting veridical information in ways that could generate 'optimal effects. In addition, self-presentation can reflect nonconscious, habitual responses triggered by relevant social cues.
When people indicate they are concerned about how others evaluate them or worry about how well they will perform in social settings, they are indicating that they are aware of the relationship between their identity and the reactions of others and that they want to receive a particular reaction (i.e., they have a self-presentational goal). Their concerns are self-presentational in nature.
Social Anxiety as a Function of SelfPresentational Problems
People are interpersonally secure in social settings when (a) they do not have the goal of creating a particular impression on others and hence are not immediately concerned about others' evaluative reactions or (b) they are attempting to create a particular impression and believe they will be successful in doing so. In a large percentage of social settings, however, people do not have such security. Although they may want to create a particular impression, they may (a) be uncertain about how to go about doing so (e.g., it may be a novel situation or they may not know what sort of attributes the others are likely to be impressed with); (b) think they will not be able to project the types of images that will produce preferred reactions from others (e.g., they may want to be seen as com-petent but doubt they will be); (c) think they will not project the quantity of the image they seek (e.g., they think they will be seen as slightly competent but want to be seen as extremely competent); or (d) believe that some event will occur that will repudiate their self-presentations, causing them to lose public esteem (e.g., they will fail an upcoming test after having bragged about their ability). In short, despite their desire to create a particular impression, they believe they will not achieve the preferred impression-relevant reaction from others. These conditions should generate social anxiety. Proposition 1. Social anxiety arises in real or imagined social situations when people are motivated to make a particular impression on others but doubt that they will do so, because they have expectations of unsatisfactory impression-relevant reactions from others. When people have the goal of creating a particular impression, either as an exclusive goal or in conjunction with other goals, we say they are motivated to make a particular impression on others. The more important the goal is, the greater the motivation will be (see below).
All goal-directed actions imply the existence of standards for evaluating the degree to which the action was successful in achieving the goal. Actions that result in consequences that meet or exceed one's standard will be regarded as satisfactory, whereas those that fail to meet the standard will produce dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction will increase as the discrepancy between the performance and the actor's standards increases and as the discrepancy is relevant to more important goals or standards. The standards that are relevant to self-presentation reflect the images people would prefer to project. The perceived or imagined impression-relevant reactions'of audiences serve as the feedback pertinent to these standards and determine whether people are satisfied or dissatisfied with their movement toward self-presentational goals.
Individual differences in standards help to explain why people who are, as judged by outside observers, coming across well socially may still feel anxious. Given the same positive reactions from others, people with low , standards may feel quite satisfied, whereas those with higher standards might feel dissatisfied and socially anxious. Bandura (1969) notes that "many of the people who seek treatment [for anxiety] are neither incompetent nor anxiously inhibited, but they experience a great deal of personal distress stemming from excessively high standards for self-evaluation, often supported by unfavorable comparisons with models noted for their extraordinary achievements" (p. 37).
People will doubt that they will present themselves in ways that create preferred impressions when they believe there is a low probability of obtaining satisfactory impression-relevant reactions from pertinent audiences. If people perceive or imagine that the pertinent others have formed the preferred impression (that is, their impression-relevant reactions are as they should be), they will have accomplished their goal. We thus assume that people hold outcome expectancies of the likelihood that their self-presentational goals will be accomplished. 2 These outcome expectancies will be affected by the nature of the situation, pertinent audience, and the actor's perceived skills, attributes, and resources. The lower people's impression-relevant outcome expectancies are, the greater their doubts about creating a preferred impression will be.
The perceived inability to predict, control, and obtain desired outcomes has been viewed as a major antecedent of anxiety (e.g., Sarason, 1978; Seligman, 1975) . Such inability has been hypothesized to generate self-preoccupation, self-derogation, and feelings of helplessness when outcomes are viewed as contingent on behavior (Sarason, 1978; Wortman & Brehm, 1975) . In the case of social anxiety, the inability relates to the belief that one is unlikely to achieve a self-presentational goal.
Proposition la. Given the goal of impressing audiences, the amount of social anxiety experienced by people will be inversely related to their outcome expectancies. The less 2 The concepts of outcome expectancies and standards provide a common ground between the present formulation of social anxiety and (a) social learning theory (e.g., Bandura, 1977) and (b) information processing models (e.g., Carver, 1979) . These commonalities will be considered in a later section.
likely people believe they are to receive the preferred reaction from audiences, the more anxiety they will experience.
Proposition Ib. Given the goal of impressing audiences, the amount of social anxiety experienced by people will depend on the perceived discrepancy between the reactions of audiences and the standard. The greater the discrepancy, the greater the anxiety will be.
Proposition Ic. Given a discrepancy, the amount of social anxiety experienced by people will depend on the importance of the goal or standard that is pertinent to the performance. The more important the goal or standard is, the greater the anxiety will be. Sullivan's (1953) description of the genesis and nature of anxiety is compatible with the present analysis. According to Sullivan, the etiology of anxiety begins with the child's encounters with the disapproval of significant others, such as parents or nurse. The discomfort associated with such encounters is what Sullivan called the early sensory form of anxiety. Once the self-concept has developed, people can evaluate their own behaviors from a social perspective and internally generate the praise or disapproval that would be relevant. Ultimately, anxiety can be produced by any sort of perceived failure or inability to predict and control environmental events, whether social or nonsocial. The interpersonal genesis of the experience perhaps explains why it is marked by self-doubt, feelings of inadequacy, and self-blame: These cognitive responses are the internalized aftermath of the disapproval received from others. Concerns about the real or imagined disapproval of others for one's identity have been mentioned frequently in subsequent analyses of anxiety (e.g., Fischer, 1970) .
Sullivan's Conceptualization of Anxiety
Social anxiety offers the most direct parallel to the types of experiences Sullivan described as underlying all anxiety. In social anxiety, the salient feature is the threat of unsatisfactory evaluations from audiences. In other forms of anxiety, as in the case of anxiety from potentially harmful situations, concerns about one's ability to cope with prospective dangers are not seen as interpersonal in origin. The disapproval and feelings of inadequacy that are generated are perceived as self-evaluations that are divorced from interpersonal evaluations, even though the process of self-evaluation had its genesis in the social interaction process. For further discussion of the relationship between selfevaluations and evaluations by others, see Schlenker (in press-a) and Snyder, Stucky, and Higgins (in press ).
Antecedents of Social Anxiety
We will now turn to a further delineation of the major antecedents of social anxiety indicated in Proposition 1-the motivation to create a preferred impression and doubts that one will do so-along with an examination of relevant research.
Motivation to Impress Others
It is proposed that a necessary but not sufficient condition for social anxiety is that people be motivated to make a particular impression on audiences. People who do not have such a goal in the setting, and hence are unconcerned about prospective evaluations, will not feel socially anxious. Even when people do not begin a social interaction with such a goal, events can occur that make interpersonal evaluation salient, for example, people might notice that others are giving cues suggesting disapproval, or they might commit a faux pas that threatens their identities. Such events can shift attention from other goals to the goal of creating a preferred impression.
The potential for experiencing social anxiety will increase as the motivation to impress others increases. If people also have low impression-relevant outcome expectancies, social anxiety will result. As suggested in Proposition Ic, the motivation to impress others will be a direct function of the importance of the pertinent goal or standard. Importance will be affected by (a) the subjective worth of the outcomes that are associated with the goal and (b) the centrality of the goal or standard, that is, the degree to which it subsumes or satisfies other important goals or standards. A variety of audience, situational, and personal factors, alone or in interaction, will affect such motivation and set the stage for the experience of social anxiety.
Characteristics of others. Characteristics of others that increase the subjective value of the outcomes they might bestow will increase the motivation to impress them; we will call these the strength of the others. People who are powerful, esteemed, attractive, expert, or high in status can mediate a variety of worthwhile outcomes. They can often mediate material gains or losses (e.g., promotions, raises, awards, dismissal, physical harm); their approval, respect, friendship, and assistance are highly valued; and their opinions are viewed as salient in confirming or disconfirming one's purported strengths or weaknesses. The motivation to impress such others is high.
The presence of these characteristics in others can also affect the subjective likelihood of creating a satisfactory impression. High-strength others usually appear to be more discerning and difficult to please (Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1973) and may evoke feelings of inadequacy on the part of the actor through the process of social comparison (Morse & Gergen, 1970) . Thus, people will be more highly motivated to impress such others and more likely to entertain doubts that they will.
People are more likely to report being tense and nervous when dealing with those who are powerful, competent, high in status, or in positions of authority than with those who are not (Jackson & Latane, 1981; Latane & Harkins, 1976; Zimbardo, 1977) . Jones and Russell (Note 1) found that nearly 80% of their subjects reported experiencing shyness when interacting with "authority figures." Jackson and Latane (1981) asked subjects to imagine themselves singing the "Star Spangled Banner" in front of a variety of different audiences and rate how nervous and tense they were. High-strength others produced more nervousness and tension than low-strength others. Similarly, people engage in more "face saving" behavior that appears to be indicative of embarrassment when the audience is composed of competent rather than incompetent others or "evaluators" rather than "nonevaluators" (Brown, 1970; Brown & Garland, 1971; Garland & Brown, 1972) .
Evaluative implications of the performance. Factors that increase the evaluative implications of a social performance should increase the motivation to impress others. These include such conditions as the importance of the performance, the anonymity of the actor, the number of coperformers present, and the size of the audience.
Some performances are more important than others in terms of their impact on the audience's reactions. First impressions, for example, usually generate a primacy effect that can have a lingering influence on others' perceptions (e.g., Jones & Goethals, 1972) . Thus, a first meeting with one's nance's parents would generate more motivation to impress them than would a casual luncheon several months later. First dates also generate considerable concern for how one will appear and are usually mentioned by respondents as inducing nervousness and shyness (Zimbardo, 1977) . As the evaluative overtones surrounding a performance increase, so does the motivation to impress others. Leavy (Note 2) told subjects who believed they were interacting with another individual via an intercom either to "try to get the other subject to like you" or simply to "act as naturally as possible." Subjects who were instructed to make a favorable impression reported feeling significantly more shy than those who were not. McCoy (1965) found that telling children they would be working on a "test" rather than a "game" decreased their verbalizations, and Gynther (1957) found that arousing evaluation apprehension in college students reduced their communication efficiency; these responses are usually associated with anxiety.
When people's behaviors are private and will not come to the attention of others, less social anxiety will be experienced than when the behaviors are public. People may, of course, imagine how significant others would react to their behavior and feel pride or anxiety, but the experience would be somewhat muted as compared with when significant others are actually present (Schlenker, 1980) . Although there has been relatively little research comparing anxiety experienced under public versus private conditions, there are indications that the hypothesized relation holds. Modigliani (1971) found that people are less embarrassed and engage in less facesaving behavior under private than public conditions of failure.
The number of coperformers present during an actor's social performance will also affect the motivation to impress audiences. When people perform in groups, their audience must divide attention among the various performers, each coperformer is somewhat more anonymous, and the actors can diffuse responsibility among themselves for inferior performances (Jackson & Latane, 1981) . In support of the idea that there is safety in numbers, Jackson and Latane (1981) found that the number of coperformers decreased nervousness and tension both in a laboratory situation where subjects imagined themselves performing before others and in a field study where people participated in a talent show. Similarly, Barber (1939) found that chronic stutterers exhibited more speech disruptions, which presumably reflect nervousness, when reciting a passage alone than with groups of others; the greater the number of coperformers, the fewer the disruptions. Each coperformer added to the situation, however, will have a smaller impact than the previous coperformer (Jackson & Latane, 1981) . An exception to the tension-reducing effect of coperformers may occur when people believe they will perform well but their coperformers will perform poorly and thereby hide their meritorious contribution and make them look bad.
The size of the audience will increase the motivation to impress them, at least up to some asymptote. The evaluations of many people have the potential for greater impact on the actor than the evaluations of a few. Thus, people report being more tense and nervous as the size of their audience increases (Jackson & Latane, 1981; Latane & Harkins, 1976) . Porter (1939) found that stuttering, presumably a sign of nervousness, increased with audience size. Also, children speak less when completing sentence stems if they speak before a larger than smaller audience (Levin, Baldwin, Gallwey, & Paivo, 1960) , which suggests that they experience greater social anxiety with the larger audience. Each additional audience member, however, should have less of an impact than the previous one (Jackson & Latane, 1981) .
Image central ity. People will be more motivated to create a preferred impression on others when the interaction focuses on images that are more rather than less central to their identities. Creating a preferred impression will not only allow them to receive the interpersonal benefits (e.g., approval, respect) associated with being viewed in these personally important ways, but will also permit them to receive self-defining feedback that could reduce any uncertainty they might have about whether they really possess these attributes. A woman who, for example, prides herself on being an intellectual but does not care about her athletic ability should be more motivated to impress others when engaged in an intellectual discussion than when talking about her ability at tennis. Social anxiety should result, however, only if she also has doubts about whether she will create the preferred impression.
Self-attention. Self-attention appears to play a crucial role in activating concern about one's identity. Self-attention refers to directing conscious attention inward, toward rather than away from the self (Buss, 1980; Carver, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Fenigstein, 1979; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) . Such a state can be situationally induced, and some people are chronically more likely to focus attention on themselves.
When attention is focused inward, it can produce either private or public self-consciousness. Private self-consciousness is an awareness of the internal self, such as one's thoughts and feelings, and public self-consciousness is an awareness of oneself as a social object (Fenigstein, 1979) . Those who are publicly self-conscious report that they feel as though they are being observed when in the company of others, have a high awareness of how others regard them, view others' behaviors as having high personal relevance, and demonstrate increased responsiveness to negative interpersonal evaluations (Fenigstein, 1979 ). In addition, it has been hypothesized that a "major consequence of self-consciousness is an increased concern with the presentation of self and the reactions of others to that presentation" (Fenigstein, 1979, p. 75) . Those who are not publicly self-conscious, on the other hand, have little awareness of or interest in how they are coming across to others. Since evaluation is more salient when people are publicly self-conscious, they should be more motivated to make a preferred impression on those with whom they interact. Even so, they should not feel socially anxious unless they also doubt they will receive satisfactory impression-relevant reactions from others. Fenigstein et al. (1975) similarly suggest that public self-consciousness is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for social anxiety.
Chronic public self-consciousness is significantly positively correlated with general measures of social anxiety (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Pilkonis, 1977a; Leavy, Note 2) . It has also been found to be positively correlated with general measures of shyness (Cheek & Buss, 1982) , social reticence (Jones & Russell, Note 3), interaction anxiousness (Leary, in press), audience anxiousness (Leary, in press) , and embarrassment (Froming & Brody, Note 4). In addition, it correlates significantly with self-reports of shyness (Pilkonis, 1977a; Leavy, Note 2) and anxiety (Leavy, Note 2) in specific dyadic encounters. Levin et al. (1960) found that children who were classified as highly self-conscious spoke for a shorter length of time in front of an unfamiliar audience and made more speech errors seemingly indicative of anxiety than those who were classified as low in self-consciousness. Although these studies are correlational in nature, there are at least some grounds for suggesting that public self-consciousness increases people's potential for becoming socially anxious. 3 People who are chronically high in public self-consciousness may also be somewhat more likely to entertain doubts about their self-presentational abilities across a wide variety of situations. Fenigstein (1979) suggested that public self-consciousness increases concerns about receiving negative interpersonal evaluations, and Leavy (Note 2) found public self-consciousness to be negatively related to self-esteem (r = -.29, p < .02).
Self-attention increases the actor's focus on meeting salient standards for performance, leading to a comparison between the self and the standard (Carver, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) . When people adopt selfpresentational goals, the standards for their performance reflect their effectiveness in procuring satisfactory impression-relevant reactions from others. If people believe they are meeting or will meet the standards (i.e., they have a favorable outcome expectancy), they experience positive affect. However, the belief that "one cannot alter one's behavior in the direction appropriate to the standard may also lead to negative affect in proportion to the importance of the behavioral dimension or the standard and the perceived magnitude of the discrepancy" (Carver, 1979 (Carver, , p. 1266 . In terms of the present approach, selfattention should make extant self-presentational problems more salient and produce the type of negative affect associated with anxiety. Further, self-attention should make people more aware of internal states, including their thoughts and affect, and intensify them (Carver, 1979) . This could further heighten the experience of social anxiety.
Other personality variables. Any individual difference factors that heighten the motivation to impress others have the potential for generating social anxiety. These include such variables as high needs for social approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) , otherdirectedness (Hogan & Cheek, in press) , and high fear of negative evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969) . People who are other-directed or want to gain approval/avoid disapproval should be highly motivated to come across well to others. Further, people who score high in the need for approval seem to lack the "confidence, assertiveness, and skill to make the most of social situations" (Schlenker, 1980, p. 79) . Thus, such people should.have both high motivation and be more likely to entertain doubts about their abilities to make desired impressions, generating greater social anxiety.
A high fear of negative evaluation (FNE) also has been associated with a need to obtain approval and avoid disapproval (Friend & Gilbert, 1973; Smith & Campbell, 1973; Watson & Friend, 1969; Leary, 1980) . In addition, Leavy (Note 2) found that subjects who scored high as compared with low in FNE reported more doubts about their abilities to create a favorable impression on others, and FNE was negatively correlated with self-esteem (;• = -.55, p < .001). It should be expected, then, that FNE should generally increase social anxiety. Indeed, Leavy (Note 2) found that FNE is significantly correlated with self-reports of anxiety (r = .48, p < .001) and shyness (r = .42, p < .001) during a dyadic encounter and with scores on the Social Anxiety subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (r = .65,;; < .001). Fear of negative evaluation has also been found to correlate positively with social avoidance and distress (Watson & Friend, 1969) and self-reports of interaction and audience anxiousness (Leary, in press ). Finally, Nicholls (1974) found that the most common characteristic of hospitalized socially phobic individuals is sensitiveness to and fearfulness of disapproval.
Low Outcome Expectancies
Given the goal of making a particular impression on others, people will become socially anxious to the extent that they doubt they will do so. Such doubts will be generated when (a) people are uncertain about how to do so, or (b) although people believe they know how such an impression can be created, their perceptions of the situation, audience, and their own attributes, skills, and resources lead them to believe they cannot achieve the goal. People will then perceive or imagine a discrepancy between their performances and the relevant standards. As proposed in Propositions la and Ib, the lower their outcome expectancies and the greater the perceived discrepancy between performance and standard, the more socially anxious they will feel.
Uncertainty. When people are motivated to impress others they access information from memory or seek information regarding the ways the others are likely to respond to particular self-presentations. They then present their self-presentations in a way that capitalizes (at least somewhat) on the others' preferences and the situational contingencies that are relevant to their goals (Schlenker, 1980, in press-a) . Difficulties arise when guides to self-presentation-such as situational cues, information about others' preferences, and familiarity with accepted ways of responding-are absent, ambiguous, or contradictory. People should then become uncertain about how to respond and experience doubts about whether they will obtain satisfactory impression-relevant reactions.
Uncertainty has been proposed as a major antecedent of anxiety. Dibner (1958, p. 165) observed that "anxiety is directly related to the degree of ambiguity in the situation to which the individual must make some adjustive reaction." Pilkonis (1977b) noted that "shyness is less of a problem in those contexts where influences such as task demands and role requirements remove the ambiguity present in 'unfocused' interpersonal encounters" (p. 604), and Buss (1980) commented that "the most frequent and important situational cause [of shyness] appears to be novelty" (p. 187). Phillips (1968) suggested that chronic reticence may be caused by actors' "not knowing the rules" in certain social situations.
Self-reports of social anxiety (including shyness) have been found to increase in novel and unstructured situations and in encounters with people about whom the actor knows relatively little (Pilkonis, 1977b; Zimbardo, 1977; Jones & Russell, Note 3; Leary, 1980) . Such situations make it difficult for people to formulate a plan for behavior and to predict how others will react to them. Conversely, reports of anxiety or shyness rarely occur in familiar situations, particularly those involving friends and family (Zimbardo, 1977) .
Uncertainty is also heightened when unexpected events occur, as when an embarrassing incident happens or people are interacting with others who are unpredictable. Unexpected events disrupt the ongoing interaction and thrust the participants into a state of uncertainty (Goffman, 1967) . Geller, Goodstein, Silver, and Sternberg (1974) found that when others violate the implicit rules of social interaction-by ignoring an individual, for example-the situation becomes ambiguous and the individual reports feeling shy.
The clearest examples of uncertainty occur when people lack a coherent script or plan for the social setting. Such might be the case at one's first school dance, first formal dinner party, and so on. There are questions in the mind of the actor: What should I do? What happens next? How will others react to me? Awkward, tentative interactions are likely to occur that may further heighten the actor's anxiety. There are many occasions when people know how they would like to appear but do not know how to go about doing so. Their cognitive schemas for the situation do not contain adequate response-specifying information. For instance, people who are unskilled in the rules of etiquette and lacking experience in formal social settings may know that they want to appear sophisticated at a formal cocktail party but have no idea how to go about fostering that image.
In such cases, anxiety would be reduced by instructing people about (a) the sequence of events to be expected, (b) the behaviors that should be employed given certain goals and antecedent conditions, and (c) the likely responses of others to particular behaviors. Therapy aimed at increasing social skills often provides such instruction, either directly or through modeling. Similarly, self-help courses on how to win friends, be successful in business, be assertive, and so forth usually provide people with lists of simple rules about what to do in various situations. Some such rules are undoubtedly effective in accomplishing their objective of increasing knowledge or skills. Equally or even more important, though, should be the increased confidence experienced by people who learn the rules; they now possess a set of specific instructions. They should believe in their ability to predict and control others' reactions, and social anxiety should decrease. Of course, any initial increment in confidence could later be eliminated if people discovered that their new-found instructions did not really aid them in predicting and controlling social situations.
Individual difference variables can exacerbate the problems encountered in ambiguous situations and heighten social anxiety. Factors that make people less sensitive to social cues (e.g., low social sensitivity), more dependent on the rules and preferences of others (e.g., other-directedness), or more likely to anticipate that other people will evaluate them negatively (e.g., low self-esteem, fear of negative evaluation) will predispose them to perceive more situations as ambiguous or experience lower outcome expectancies when they encounter ambiguous or novel situations.
Low outcome expectancies in the absence of uncertainty. People may perceive what should be done in order to obtain satisfactory reactions from others but still doubt that they will be likely to achieve their self-presentational goals. Low outcome expectancies often arise when people believe they do not possess the attributes, skills, accomplishments, or resources that are required to make a successful claim to the relevant image. All images have requirements, which are the characteristics, achievements, and behaviors that a holder of the image should have or be able to perform in order to claim the image legitimately (Schlenker, 1980) . People who fail to live up to the requirements of the images they project are disliked and negatively sanctioned (Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) . Because of these constraints, people's public self-presentations are usually consistent with publicly-known information about them (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Schlenker, 1975) . People who think they should claim a particular image in order to impress the audience but believe they cannot live up to such claims are caught in a least-of-evils choice situation. If they try to claim the image, they expect failure, yet if they do not make the claim, they will not create the preferred impression. Social anxiety results.
People may also privately think of themselves as having certain attractive attributes that would impress others but doubt that they can convince others they possess these attributes (Leary & Schlenker, 1981) . For example, a scientist who wishes to demonstrate his or her extensive knowledge to colleagues at a convention may feel he or she lacks the verbal fluency to impress them. In such cases, people may think their self-presentations will be ineffective because of deficiences in their expressive skills, even though they might privately believe they possess the characteristics that could impress the audience. Their expectations of unsatisfactory impression-relevant reactions could generate social anxiety.
Being overpraised by others can carry as many negative implications for the recipient as failing to receive sufficient praise. Buss (1980, pp. 138-140) notes that being overpraised in public produces discomfort; females who were overpraised by a confederate responded by showing signs of embarrassment, including blushing and nervous giggling. Unlike praise that is merited, excessive praise can raise doubts in the recipient's mind about the motives of the evaluator (e.g., "Is he serious, or is he trying to make a fool of me?"), create uncertainty about how to respond, and thrust an excessively attractive image on the recipient. Recipients might believe they cannot fulfill the extremely high standards for performance implied by the image and may envision considerable discrepancy between their future performances and the standard. A likely reaction is to reject the excessive praise: "That's nice of you to say, but I'm really not that accomplished, nice, or whatever." They thereby escape the obligation of living up to the image and appear less foolish if the evaluator is insincere. Research suggests that people will reject excessive praise when the evaluator's motives are suspect or they believe they cannot live up to the implications of the praise (Jones, 1973; Mettee & Aronson, 1974) .
A good deal of research has documented the relation between the belief that one lacks valuable social skills and the experience of social anxiety (Bellack & Hersen, 1979; Leary, 1982) . In an early study of public speaking, Gilkinson (1943) found that anxious speech students greatly underestimated their speaking ability and the quality of their speeches as compared with observers' evaluations of them. Efran and Korn (1969) showed that socially "cautious" subjects held lower expectations of success on a variety of social and verbal tasks than socially "bolder" subjects but that the two groups did not differ in their expectations of success on intellectual, artistic, or athletic pursuits. This suggests that the concerns of socially anxious people are specific to relevant social deficiencies. Paivo and Lambert (1959) showed that the susceptibility to audience anxiety in public speaking is negatively related to the frequency of rewarding past experiences in speaking situations. In a comparison of high and low socially anxious subjects, Cacioppo et al. (1979) found that the former rated themselves more negatively, generated more negative self-statements in a thought-listing task, and rated themselves as less potent and active than less anxious subjects. Similarly, Glass et al. (1982) showed that socially anxious women made significantly more negative and fewer positive self-statements in a dyadic encounter than women low in social . anxiety.
Anxious people's negative evaluations are confined primarily to themselves. Although they underestimate the quality of their social skills (compared with observers' ratings of them and with the self-evaluations of people with low anxiety), high-and low-anxious subjects (along with external observers) have been shown to agree in their appraisals of a confederate's social ability (Clark & Arkowitz, 1975) . Thus, the tendency to underestimate social performances is not due to a generalized set to see the social world negatively but appears to result from a real or imagined deficit in personal skills or attributes.
People who consider themselves to be physically unattractive may entertain doubts about their ability to achieve satisfactory reactions from others (Berscheid & Walster, 1974) . Although no research has specifically examined the relationship between self-perceived attractiveness and social anxiety, Mathes and Kahn (1975) found that physically attractive women rated themselves as less neurotic, higher in self-esteem, and happier than did less attractive women. In addition to the direct effects of self-perceived attractiveness on social anxiety, truly unattractive individuals (as judged by the standards of those with whom they interact) are likely to be regarded less favorably by others on a number of personality and social dimensions (e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1974) and thus be afforded fewer opportunities for social interaction. The result is that they may have fewer opportunities to learn and practice interpersonal skills (on dates, for example), opportunities that could otherwise build social confidence and reduce anxiety.
People with low self-esteem, who tend to perceive themselves less favorably than those with high self-esteem on a variety of dimensions and assume others do also, experience social anxiety across a variety of social settings. In support of this hypothesis, Gilkinson (1942) noted that "a somewhat gener-alized sense of inferiority is a primary cause of fear experienced before an audience" (p. 81). Zimbardo (1977) reports that self-esteem and shyness are significantly negatively correlated (r = -.48), and Leary (in press) found self-esteem to correlate negatively with both interaction and audience anxiousness.
Self-presentational difficulties are an interpersonal problem, so the context of the situation and the characteristics of the audience should interact with personal characteristics to affect situational reactions. For example, a high school athlete may have high self-esteem and believe his or her athletic skills would favorably impress a peer or younger person, but still doubt his or her ability to impress a college scout or professional athlete. Audiences who are perceived as especially competent, powerful, or critical should generate lower outcome expectancies and evoke higher standards than ones who are easier to impress (Schlenker, in press-a) . Indeed, people report greater tension and nervousness (Jackson & Latane, 1981) and engage in more face-saving behavior indicative of embarrassment (Brown & Garland, 1971; Garland & Brown, 1972) when they perceive themselves to be less rather than more competent at the specific task and when they are performing before competent rather than incompetent others. The amount of supportive feedback one receives during an interaction also affects expectations of success and hence anxiety. As compared with warm, supportive, noncritical audiences, cold, nonsupportive, or critical ones produce shorter interactions and fewer words spoken (Drennen & Wiggins, 1964; Pope & Siegman, 1968; Reece, 1964; Reece & Whitman, 1962) . Subjects who receive negative interpersonal feedback speak less and with longer speech latencies (Cervin, 1956; Miller, 1964; Taylor, Altman, & Sorrentino, 1969) and are less self-disclosing (Taylor et al., 1969) .
Even people who have low self-esteem, who have perceived skills deficits, or who tell "lies" about themselves should not feel socially anxious as long as they expect that their self-presentations will produce the desired reactions from others. People might, for example, believe that their audience is especially supportive, gullible, or has no way to check the veracity of their claims. On such occasions people should have high expectations of achieving their self-presentational goals.
Self-presentation and alternative approaches. The skills deficit, cognitive evaluation, conditioning, and personality approaches can be reconceptualized as converging on the notion that social anxiety is generated when people are motivated to impress others and hold low impression-relevant outcome expectancies. Despite this similarity, there are several differences between these approaches and the present formulation that are worth noting. First, in contrast to some versions of the conditioning approach, the present formulation adopts a cognitive perspective: Anxiety is mediated by expectations about self-presentational effectiveness. Bandura (1977) and Bolles (1972) present strong cases for the superiority of "conditioning" models that include rather than exclude cognitive variables.
Second, this formulation states that social anxiety is produced by the expectation that one will not accomplish one's self-presentational goal of impressing real or imagined audiences. The multitude of negative selfstatements people might make and that appear in studies that support the cognitive selfevaluation model (e.g., "I'm not a good date/ speaker/dancer/conversationalist/etc.") reflect not only self-evaluations but also concerns about how one might be judged in social settings.
Third, and related to this distinction, real or perceived skills deficits will only affect social anxiety to the extent that they influence the individual's expectations of receiving satisfactory impression-relevant reactions from others in the specific social situation. Similarly, personality variables that are associated with generalized expectations of poor selfpresentational performances (e.g., low selfesteem, high fear of negative evaluation) will be related to social anxiety only to the extent that they affect motivation and expectations in the specific social situation.
In summary, people will experience social anxiety to the degree that they have the goal of creating a preferred impression on others but doubt they will do so. Existing research in the area is consistent with this proposition. Variables that appear to affect the motivation to impress others and the likelihood of doing so affect social anxiety.
Social Anxiety and Interpersonal Behavior
A variety of behaviors have been associated with high social anxiety, such as reticence, hesitant words and acts, minimal selfdisclosure, and withdrawal from encounters that precipitate anxiety. After examining some of these behaviors, we will consider the relationships among cognition, social anxiety, and behavior.
Associated Behaviors
The behaviors that tend to occur when people feel socially anxious may be loosely grouped into three classes: nervous responses, disaffiliative behaviors, and image protection. When people feel socially anxious, they manifest a variety of nervous responses. They often fidget, self-manipulate (play with their hair, clothes, etc.), perspire, squirm, stutter as they speak, and generally appear nervous and jittery (Cheek & Buss, 1982; Porter, 1939; Pilkonis, 1977b; Zimbardo, 1977) . Speech disturbances (e.g., stuttering, stumbling over words, repeating words, etc.) have been used as indices for assessing anxiety in psychotherapeutic settings (Kasl & Mahl, 1965; Mahl, 1956) . High levels of anxiety impair the ability to communicate effectively (Borkovec, Stone, O'Brien, & Kaloupek, 1974; Kasl & Mahl, 1965; Murray, 1971; Pilkonis, 1977b; Swartz, 1976) . For example, stammering increases as a function of audience size (Porter, 1939) , and when reciting passages alone (where one is the center of attention), rather than with others (Barber, 1939) .
Social anxiety is also associated with disaffiliation-behaviors that decrease the actor's social contact with others. When socially anxious, people initiate conversations less frequently, are more reluctant to speak freely, speak for a lower percentage of the time and, in general, participate less fully in conversations (Cheek & Buss, 1982; Borkovec, Fleischmann, & Caputo, 1973; Glasgow & Arkowitz, 1975; Leary, 1980; Zimbardo, 1977) . In a review of the literature dealing with the relationship between anxiety and speech, Murray (1971) concluded that anxiety and speech productivity (verbal quantity, speech rate, absence of silences) are curvilinearly related as an inverse-U function. Verbal productivity increases with increasing anxiety up to some asymptote and then decreases with increasingly higher levels of anxiety. This conclusion was reached after an examination of studies that employed situational inducements of social anxiety (e.g., negative evaluations from others, increased evaluation apprehension) and nonsocial anxiety (e.g., threat of electric shock), as well as dispositional measures of social and general anxiety. More recently, Pilkonis (1977b) had subjects who were previously classified as shy or not shy converse in an unstructured, heterosexual interaction and then prepare and deliver structured speeches. During the conversation, shy people showed a longer latency to their first utterance, spoke less frequently and for shorter periods of time, and allowed longer silences to occur and were less willing to break them. Shy subjects also reported greater anxiety during delivery of the structured speeches and were viewed as more anxious by observers.
In addition to reduced verbal interaction, the disaffiliation that often accompanies social anxiety has been shown to take a number of other forms. For example, people tend to avoid situations that produce embarrassment (Brown, 1970; Brown & Garland, 1971) or involve specific ego threats (Teichman, 1978) and prefer not to affiliate with evaluative others under such conditions (Fish, Karabenick, & Heath, 1978; Sarnoff& Zimbardo, 1961; Teichman, 1973 Teichman, , 1978 Watson & Friend, 1969) . Also, people tend to avoid situations in which they expect to experience social difficulties and prematurely leave those that elicit social anxiety (Cheek & Buss, 1982; Pilkonis, 1977b; Twentyman&McFall, 1975; Zimbardo, 1977) . The tendency to maintain distance from others is also suggested by findings that socially anxious people decrease eye contact with others (Modigliani, 1971; Pilkonis, 1977b; Zimbardo, 1977) , disclose less information about themselves to others (Post, Wittmaier, & Radin, 1978) , and are generally less sociable (Cheek & Buss, 1982) than nonanxious people. As a result of their tendency to disaffiliate, shy people report a higher incidence of loneliness (Cheek & Busch, 1981;  Jones & Russell, Note 3). Heterosexually anxious individuals are less likely to date (Twentyman & McFall, 1975) and are less likely to become involved in romantic and sexual encounters (Leary & Dobbins, Note 5) .
Finally, social anxiety seems to be accompanied by behaviors that allow people to protect their public images as best they can given the perceived difficulties (Leary, 1982; Leary & Schlenker, 1981) . For example, Natale, Entin, and Jaffe (1979) found that social anxiety was negatively correlated with successful verbal interruptions of others and positively correlated with back-channel responses, that is, the brief interjections a listener makes while another is speaking to indicate he or she is listening attentively (e.g., "uh-huh"). Pilkonis (1977b) found that shy females nodded and smiled more during an opposite-sex, unstructured interaction than not-shy females (males, however, did not display such differences). These sorts of behaviors (not interrupting, attentively listening, nodding, smiling) may allow people to show polite but innocuous sociability in situations in which they doubt they can make a truly positive impression on others (Leary, 1982; Leary & Schlenker, 1981) .
Cognition, Anxiety, and Behavior
Some early conceptualizations took the position that anxiety is a drive or arousal state that energizes particular responses (e.g., Spence, 1960; see Levitt, 1967) . Although there are many variations on this theme and differences between specific theories, it was generally held that behavior (defensive behavior and task performance) is a direct consequence of the drive condition. Consequently, some theorists searched for invariant relationships between arousal and behavior (e.g., the inverted-U relation). More recent research challenges that position and focuses attention on cognitive processes that mediate both arousal and behavior (Bandura, 1977; Carver, 1979) .
According to social learning theory, arousal and behavior are coeffects and are not causally linked: "Being coeffects, there is no fixed relationship between autonomic arousal and actions" (Bandura, 1977, p. 209 ). Bandura suggests that people's level and strength of self-efficacy, or the expectation that they can successfully execute the behavior required to produce desired outcomes, determines whether coping will be initiated in a situation, how much effort will be expended, and how long effort will be sustained in the face of obstacles. From our perspective, people who are experiencing social anxiety have low expectations regarding their ability to produce preferred impression-relevant reactions from others. These expectations usually produce an avoidance of relevant social situations and a lack of effective behavior in such situations. Any arousal experienced as a consequence of threats to one's identity can intensify perceptions of low self-efficacy, since such internal states might support or intensify beliefs in one's own deficiencies. Thus, we view the arousal and affect that can accompany social anxiety and the behaviors that are associated with social anxiety as mediated by cognitive activities.
Carver's (1979) cybernetic model of selfattention processes contains several propositions that are directly relevant to our conceptualization of social anxiety. As indicated earlier, Carver proposes that self-attention increases people's concerns about meeting standards for behavior (cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972) . The goal of creating a particular impression on others should often be accompanied by self-attention (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein, 1979) . A "matching-to-standard" process, in which the actor attempts to create the sort of impression implied by the goal, should occur. Carver suggests that If something impedes the matching-to-standard process, behavior is interrupted and an assessment process is evoked. This assessment entails the further processing of relevant information yielding an outcome expectancy: an estimate of the likelihood of being able to more closely approximate the standard, based on the nature of the situation and on the behaviors available to the person, (p. 1264).
Proposition 2. An assessment process is triggered when the self-presentational goal is important to the individual or the social performance is impeded.
As the importance of the performance increases, people will become more highly motivated to make a preferred impression on others. To facilitate goal achievement, they will engage in a more de-tailed examination of self, audience, and situation than would otherwise occur. Further, if events suggest possible difficulties in reaching their goal (irrespective of an initial assessment that might have been triggered by goal importance), assessment will -occur or reoccur.
The assessment process can be triggered in advance, before entering the social setting. Factors that presage self-presentational difficulties (e.g., a powerful, critical, discerning audience), create uncertainty, or make people conscious of the import of the performance will produce assessment prior to the anticipated encounter. Similarly, people who could be labeled "chronically socially anxious" might have generalized doubts about their self-presentational abilities and engage in assessment prior to even relatively innocuous interactions.
One interesting implication of this proposition concerns the relation between very low levels of anxiety and poor social performance. According to the inverted-U function, very low levels of anxiety should generate poorer performances than somewhat higher levels of anxiety and produce less social efficiency. Many of the variables that generate low social anxiety, however, are also those that minimize concerns about how one is appearing to others (e.g., insignificant audiences, low fear of negative evaluation, easy tasks). Such variables will (a) be less likely to evoke self-presentational goals, (b) reduce self-attention, causing goal-relevant standards to be less salient, or (c) be less likely to trigger assessment either prior to or during the social encounter. The result will be behavior that is .not optimally effective in generating desirable impressions. An extreme case is those people who, after 20 years of marriage, are unconcerned about their spouses' evaluations (Schlenker, in press-a) . They take the spouse for granted, are less sensitive than formerly to social cues indicating appropriate behaviors, fail to employ standards for their behaviors that they would use when interacting with other people, and fail to monitor and control their own actions in desirable ways (e.g., allowing their physical appearance to decline, not paying attention to what they or their spouses are saying, not following normal rules of courtesy, etc.). Social performance is poor not because of the absence of social anxiety but because of the cognitive orientation the person brings to the task.
Proposition 3. If the assessment leads to the expectation that one can create the preferred impression on others, the individual will continue to work toward that objective. In addition, he or she will experience positive affect. This proposition paraphrases Carver's (1979) Propositions 1 la and 12b, making them pertinent to self-presentation. Social anxiety, if it occurred at all under such conditions, would be limited to the brief period during which the assessment process was taking place and uncertainty might be present. Once people develop a favorable outcome expectancy, social anxiety will not occur. In addition, people will experience positive affect and be satisfied with their social performances.
One of the interesting implications of this proposition is that self-attention can, under some conditions, facilitate the performance of people who are chronically anxious (Carver, 1979 (Carver, , p. 1266 . If such people encounter a situation that allows them to conclude they can accomplish their self-presentational goal successfully, self-attention will improve rather than impede their social performance. Self-attention makes standards more salient and produces greater behaviorstandard matching than would occur without self-attention. Indeed, research has shown that self-attention facilitates the performances of people who are described as chronically anxious but who have favorable outcome expectancies in the specific situation (Carver, 1979 (Carver, , p. 1266 . This prediction does not seem to follow from alternative conceptualizations of anxiety, according to which self-attention should only increase chronically anxious people's self-preoccupation and further debilitate their performances (e.g., Wine, 1971) .
Variables that make people more likely to adopt self-presentational goals and trigger assessment have the potential for increasing self-presentational effectiveness, provided people do not expect unfavorable impression-relevant outcomes. Coincidentally, such variables are often associated with moderate levels of social anxiety, the asymptotic point on the inverted-U curve for anxiety and behavior; for example, tests of moderate difficulty or audiences with intermediate status.
Because of the potentially facilitating consequences of self-attention and internal arousal, some people prepare themselves mentally prior to social performances in a fashion analogous to what athletes do prior to a big game. People who believe they can do well should try to evoke self-attention and arousal before important social performances. Once again, social performance would not be facilitated because of the social anxiety, but because of the cognitive orientation that accompanies the sorts of conditions that typically create moderate anxiety.
Proposition 4. If the assessment leads to the expectation that one cannot create the preferred impression on others, the response will be withdrawal Also, the individual will experience negative affect. This proposition paraphrases Carver's (1979) Propositions 11 b and 12a. Social anxiety occurs in such situations, and people will avoid the social situation if doing so is possible or physically withdraw from the situation if an exit can be arranged without incurring excessive social costs.
People appear to avoid, if possible, affiliating with specific others when they are concerned about impressing them and doubt they will receive satisfactory impression-relevant reactions. Social anxiety is associated with avoidance of and premature withdrawal from identity-threatening, anxiety-producing social settings (e.g., Brown, 1970; Brown & Garland, 1971; Buss, 1980; Cheek & Buss, 1982; Fish et al., 1978; Garland & Brown, 1972; Pilkonis, 1977b; Sarnoff & Zimbardo, 1961; Sattler, 1965; Schlenker, 1980; Teichman, 1978; Watson & Friend, 1969; Zimbardo, 1977) . The personal consequences of the unwillingness to interact fully with others are considerable, since such unwillingness can preclude the formation of satisfying relationships, hamper the acquisition of interpersonal skills through experience, and result in negative attributions about one's social inadequacies. * People who are socially anxious will seek to affiliate with others whom they believe they can impress or who otherwise pose no threat to their identities. Affiliation with carefully selected, supportive others can provide social comparison information that allows anxious people to assess the appropriateness of their feelings and thoughts. Studies showing that fear and anxiety sometimes increase affiliation (e.g., Schachter, 1959; Teichman, 1978) invariably involve threats that do not directly jeopardize people's social identities, for example, the threat of receiving electric shocks. Jackson and Latane (1981) suggest that chronically anxious people should seek out coperformers because doing so allows them to diffuse responsibility for the potential failure, hide in the crowd, minimize their own participation, and obtain moral support. Thus, socially anxious people (either dispositionally or situationally) should affiliate with others they expect to impress but avoid those they expect not to impress.
Avoiding or withdrawing from anxietyproducing social situations is not always possible. Coexisting pressures (e.g., job demands, social responsibilities) may make the situation unavoidable, and there may be no way of exiting gracefully (without incurring severe social costs). When this occurs, people will cognitively withdraw, mentally dissociating themselves from the task at hand-that of creating a preferred impression on the audience (cf. Carver, 1979) . People may then daydream about more preferred activities or outcomes. Such task-irrelevant cognitive activity should reduce people's sensitivity to and utilization of relevant task cues, and impede self-monitoring and the control of task-relevant actions.
Proposition 5, If withdrawal is not possible, people become trapped in the assessment stage, reexamining themselves and the situation and replaying the problems they confront. This proposition (cf. Carver, 1979 Carver, , p. 1266 ) accounts for the self-preoccupation that is often associated with high anxiety. Anxious people have been described as selffocused: concentrating on their own imperfections and inadequacies in a way that debilitates their task performances (Sarason, 1976 (Sarason, , 1978 Wine, 1971) . The greater the anxiety, the more self-preoccupation will occur.
The combination of cognitive withdrawal, self-preoccupation, and negative affect/ arousal produces the decline of social per-formance that is associated with states of high anxiety. People feel especially nervous, speech output and productivity decline, speech disruptions increase, and people are less sensitive to cues and information regarding appropriate self-presentations (e.g., the cuing functions of others' behavior, the relevant social norms). In addition, the distraction decreases self-monitoring and control over behaviors. Behaviors that otherwise would be suppressed because they would create an undesired impression are more likely to leak through one's weakened guard (e.g., nervous, fidgety responses). Such behaviors are associated with the right-most portion of the inverted-U relationship between anxiety and behavior; as anxiety reaches a high state, performance declines. The high arousal state and the performance decrements are again proposed to be mediated by the person's cognitive state.
Proposition 6. When people are frozen in the assessment phase and unable to withdraw, they will enact alternative self-presentational goals that are less preferred but more viable (i.e., associated with higher outcome expectancies). They might consider innocuous images, such as being quietly pleasant, or engage in self-presentational habits that have been employed frequently in the past. These activities place fewer demands on their diminished capacities. Such alternatives also involve a lowering of aspirations, since they are unlikely to yield the originally preferred social outcomes. At best, these alternatives permit the individual to avoid the highly unfavorable outcomes that are expected to accompany self-presentational failures. An extremely shy person, for example, might nod and smile at appropriate moments while others are speaking, thereby appearing to be nice, if not incisive or intelligent.
These alternatives would not be expected to replace the original goal. Rather, they will coexist with it. People must do something, even while being obsessed with the difficulties of achieving the original goal, and these alternatives provide the action guides they use. People will vacillate, though, between the original goal and the alternative. They are still trying to reach the original goal and are still anxious, but they are doing something to make the best of a bad situation.
In the case of people who are anxious because of uncertainty about how to respond, these alternative behaviors serve as stalling tactics that permit them to examine the situation more closely before committing themselves to a more definitive self-presentational stance. People bide their time until they surmise how best to make a satifactory impression. In the case of people who are anxious because of perceived deficits in selfpresentational abilities, these behaviors conceal the more blatant self-presentational failures that are expected to accompany more complete participation. By remaining silent, not interrupting others, smiling, nodding, and withholding information about themselves, they protect themselves and appear nonassertively friendly or sociable. McGovern (1976) notes that "the response of no response may be a learned method of coping with ambiguity and time pressures for [highly socially anxious] individuals" (p. 94).
In addition, Efran and Korn (1969) observed that "when the socially cautious person does participate, the content of his contribution is generally 'safe.' He waits until he has learned what kind of comment his 'audience' will appreciate or restricts his remarks to the patently nonoffensive" (p. 78). The individual might even have his or her actions misinterpreted by others and be seen as mysteriously aloof, or quiet but deep. The use of disclaimers is another means of keeping one's participation socially safe and noncommitting. Disclaimers are verbal statements that are used in advance to dispel negative impressions that might be conveyed by an actor's intended conduct (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975) . For example, socially anxious people might hedge their statements with comments such as "Sometimes I think that . . .""I could be wrong, but. . ." "I haven't given it much thought, but. . . ." They might also ask the audience to suspend evaluative judgment with comments such as, "Don't get me wrong, but. . . ." Through disclaimers, people try out various self-presentations and get feedback from others without incurring the costs that would be associated with a more definitive but disapproved stance. The use of disclaimers should increase when people are experiencing social anxiety and want to present themselves in a safe, noncommitting manner.
Proposition 7. People will avoid attributing self-presentational difficulties to important personal dimensions to the extent they can find a viable alternative explanation for the problem. People who anticipate or encounter self-presentational difficulties can usually find a wide range of potential causes. These range from ones in the situation (e.g., "The boss always intimidates everyone;" "Everyone feels nervous while giving a speech"), to personal factors, including debilitating internal conditions (e.g., "I didn't get much sleep last night;" "I have a lot on my mind and just can't concentrate on this now"), lack of relevant experience (e.g., "This was only my first job interview so it's not too surprising that it didn't go well"), lack of effort (e.g., "If only I had planned more for the speech, it would have gone much better"), and lack of relevant attributes or skills (e.g., "I just don't have what it takes to do well at this"), to the combination of self and situation (e.g., "I don't like this kind of party, but I do feel more comfortable at other types"). The explanation people employ not only defines the causal "truth" underlying the event from their perspectives, but also can affect their esteem. Judicious selection from among causal alternatives allows people to avoid lowering their standing on important dimensions. People who, for example, attribute a self-presentational failure to aspects of the situation or a temporary internal state (e.g., having a cold) can maintain belief in their social ability. They thereby maintain self-esteem and, if they can convince others that the difficulty was caused by these less threatening factors, public esteem as well.
Attributional statements can be used to secure and maintain desired identities both to others and oneself. It has been well documented that people who encounter self-presentational difficulties (e.g., public failures on important tests) attempt to account for the performance by proferring self-serving explanations that minimize the impact of the event for important personal dimensions (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Schlenker, 1980, in press-b) . In addition, people who anticipate upcoming self-presentational problems offer accounts in advance. For example, nervous people who are concerned about their performance on an upcoming speech might tell associates that they feel a cold coming on and just aren't their usual selves that day. If they then perform poorly, the associates might be more likely to attribute the performance to the cold rather than the actors' poor preparation or abilities.
Self-serving explanations are not always viable. A preferred explanation can be contradicted by other facts known about the present situation (e.g., it is clear the actor does not have a cold), other facts known about the actor (e.g., he or she has a reputation for similar failures in the past), or the consensus of opinion of others (e.g., members of the audience believe the actor really has a low standing on the dimension). Conditions that make the situation less ambiguous by eliminating alternative explanations for the problem constrain the attributions people can make, compelling them to attribute the performance to a nonpreferred, selfthreatening cause. To the extent that alternative explanations are viable, however, people will attribute their inferior performances to causes that do not jeopardize their standings on personally important dimensions.
People who are chronically socially anxious are more likely than the average person to perceive constraints on their self-presentations, including their attributional statements. They are more likely to have low impression-relevant outcome expectancies across a wider variety of situations, to have developed reputations for failure, and to have less confidence in their ability to persuade others that a self-flattering explanation is justified. This is not to suggest that chronically socially anxious people will always display self-effacing attributions, since they will attribute their performances to self-flattering causes when they perceive no constraints. But they will be more sensitive to cues that suggest constraints and display more pronounced self-effacing attributions than the average person across a wider variety of situations. Indeed, Arkin, Appleman, and Burger (1980) found that subjects who scored high but not low in chronic social anxiety became far more self-effacing in their performance attributions, accepting responsibility for failure and rejecting it for success, when a committee of high prestige others was to evaluate their behavior than when such an evaluation was canceled. When the threat of the evaluation did not exist, socially anxious subjects presented themselves in a more flat-tering fashion, taking greater responsibility for success than failure. In a second study, Arkin et al. replicated the tendency for socially anxious subjects to take more responsibility for failure than success, and found it was more prominent when subjects' attributions were assessed via the bogus pipeline procedure, in which they believed their "private" reactions to success and failure could be detected by the experimenter. Thus, people who are chronically socially anxious seem especially sensitive to constraints on their self-presentations.
Proposition 8. People are likely to employ self-handicapping tactics when more attractive alternative explanations for self-presentational problems are unavailable, the social performance is pertinent to a personally important dimension, and uncertainty exists about their standing on the dimension. If no self-serving explanations are available that adequately account for self-presentational difficulties that threaten self-and public-esteem, people may employ selfrhandicapping strategies. In an excellent analysis of "psychopathological symptoms" as forms of selfhandicapping, Snyder and Smith (in press) define self-handicapping as a process wherein a person, in response to an anticipated loss of self-esteem resulting from the possibility of inadequate performance in a domain where performance clearly implicates ability or competence, adopts characteristics or behaviors that superficially constitute admission of a problem, weakness or deficit, but assist the individual in (1) controlling attributions (made by oneself or others) concerning performance so as to discount the self-relevant implications of success, (2) avoiding the threatening evaluative situation entirely, or (3) maintaining existing environmental conditions that maximize positive self-relevant feedback and minimize negative self-relevant feedback. Jones and Berglas (1978; first suggested and demonstrated that people will exaggerate the influence of impediments and handicaps to the point of "stacking the cards" against themselves to increase the likelihood of failure, thereby discounting the personal implications of poor performance. If, for example, an individual fails in some intellectual or social endeavor while inebriated, the poor performance can be discounted by attributing it to the alcohol and not the individual's task-relevant skills. If, on the other hand, the inebriated individual does well, attributions to relevant skills are augmented: The person triumphed despite the debilitating effects of the handicap.
Suffering from anxiety can similarly be used as a self-handicapping tactic (Leary & Schlenker, 1981; Snyder & Smith, in press ). Smith, Snyder, and Handelsman (1982) demonstrated the self-protective function of anxiety. High test anxious females were told that they would be taking a two-part intelligence test. To manipulate their concerns about evaluation, they were told either that the test was widely used and they would be given test feedback after the second part (evaluation condition) or that the test was new and still being developed, so they would not receive performance feedback after the second part (nonevaluation condition). To affect the relevance of anxiety as an esteemprotecting tactic, subjects in the evaluation condition were also either (a) told that anxiety interferes with performance on the test, (b) told that anxiety seems to have no effect on performance on the test, or (c) given no information about anxiety and performance. After they completed the first pail of the test, subjects were made uncertain about their performance on the second part by providing them with mixed performance-feedback. Subjects were then asked to report their levels of anxiety prior to beginning the critical second portion of the test.
It was found that subjects in the nonevaluation condition reported the lowest level of anxiety. These subjects should not have been as concerned with the self-relevant implications of their performance, and so they should actually have been less anxious. They also would have had no reason to employ anxiety for self-protective purposes. In the evaluation condition, however, subjects not only reported more anxiety, but said they were most anxious when they had been told either nothing about the relationship between anxiety and performance or that anxiety debilitates performance. Subjects who were told that anxiety was not a viable excuse for poor performance reported reduced effort on the test as an alternative self-protective tactic.
Given the self-report basis of the measures used in this study by Smith et al., it is not clear whether the subjects who reported high anxiety were simply doing so as an excuse for a potentially poor performance, were actually experiencing high anxiety in a way that would act as a real handicap to future performance, or both. Anxiety provides a viable excuse of the sort described in Proposition 7 as well as the type of handicap covered by Proposition 8.
In any case, people can employ self-handicapping in situations where they are experiencing or expect to experience self-presentational difficulties. For example, socially anxious people who fear being seen as interpersonally incompetent may avoid encounters that are expected to present social difficulties. Although such behavior precludes the development of friendships, it allows the person to attribute the lack of sociability to choice rather than lack of interpersonal skills. Similarly, an individual who is experiencing social anxiety at a party might drink more than usual so that interpersonal difficulties may be attributed to the alcohol rather than to personal deficiencies.
Self-handicapping is most likely to occur when people anticipate self-presentational difficulties that are relevant to an important personal dimension, alternative attractive explanations of the poor performance are unavailable, and uncertainty exists about their standing on the dimension. Self-handicapping can involve potential costs to the user's identity, since many handicaps have negative connotations (e.g., being an alcoholic or being anxious). For this reason, people will avoid highlighting handicaps unless they are already known to have the handicap (e.g., the person with the reputation of being socially anxious) or alternative, more attractive explanations for the performance are unavailable. Self-handicapping also will be reserved for performances that are pertinent to more rather than less important personal dimensions Snyder & Smith, in press ). Unimportant dimensions produce less self-presentational concern and do not justify resorting to handicaps that may themselves carry negative connotations. Finally, self-handicapping is more likely to occur when uncertainty exists about the actor's standing on the pertinent dimension Snyder & Smith, in press) . If people (the actor included) are convinced that the actor lacks the attributes or skills that are pertinent to the dimension, self-handicapping would serve no purpose. Thus, the person who is known (by himself and others) to lack important social skills may drink to get his mind off his problems, but cannot by doing so deflect an attribution that has already been made. Self-handicapping is only useful when it can deflect attributions from the dimension to the handicap.
Proposition 9. People who conceptualize themselves as socially anxious are more likely to experience social anxiety and display the behaviors associated with anxiety across a wide range of social situations. When people experience social anxiety across a wide range of situations (consistency), believe they experience it more intensely or often than others (distinctiveness), and believe that others view them as socially anxious (consensus), they will eventually come to conceptualize themselves as "socially anxious." The self-construct "socially anxious" (or its forms, e.g., "shy," "embarrassable") can create a self-fulfilling prophecy.
People who have well established self-constructs on a particular dimension are selectively attentive and more responsive to information that is relevant to the dimension (Markus, 1977) . Socially anxious people will be sensitized to cues that suggest internal arousal, imply self-presentational difficulties, or focus them on the evaluative reactions of others. Consequently, they are more likely to enter the assessment process described in Proposition 2. Further, they are more likely to interpret ambiguous information in a way that is consistent with their self-constructs, by interpreting (a) any internal arousal they feel as an indication of anxiety or (b) any information that remotely suggests a self-presentational problem as a portent of failure. The tendency to perceive and remember others' negative evaluations should exacerbate anxiety. Smith and Sarason (1975) found that highly and moderately socially anxious subjects rated negative feedback from others as more negative than nonanxious subjects and were more disturbed by it. O'Banion and Arkowitz (1977) showed that highly socially anxious women remembered negative incidents during an interaction with a male confederate better than women low in social anx-iety. Of course, assessment could still generate favorable outcome expectancies, in which case they would not feel socially anxious on that occasion (Proposition 3). The odds are increased, however, that they will emerge from assessment with an unfavorable outcome expectancy. Social anxiety will again be generated and serve as further confirmation for their self-schemas. In short, they should experience social anxiety and display the types of behaviors associated with anxiety across a wider range of situations than people who do not view themselves as socially anxious.
It should be clear that from this perspective, chronic social anxiety represents a cognitive label, a self-construct, that people apply to themselves and that mediates their arousal and behavior in social settings. The self-construct does not cause anxiety but has ramifications for the processing of information that can result in what we view as the internal reactions and overt behaviors associated with anxiety. These self-constructs are susceptible to change through techniques that modify cognitive structures and self-efficacy expectations (Bandura, 1977) .
The Forms of Social Anxiety
The diverse forms of social anxiety frequently mentioned in the literature-socialevaluative anxiety, dating anxiety, shyness, stagefright, and so forth-often seem to reflect (a) theorists' preferences for a particular word or phrase and (b) the specific type of situation in which the anxiety is manifested (e.g., if a person is on a date, it is dating anxiety; on stage, it is stagefright) rather than any profound difference in the experience itself. Yet, there does seem to be at least one underlying dimension that provides a heuristic classification of different types of social anxiety and has implications for both the antecedents of each and the likely behavioral reactions (Leary, 1982; Leary & Schlenker, 1981) .
Social settings differ in the degree to which people's behaviors follow from or are contingent on the responses of others (Jones & Gerard, 1967) . In contingent interactions, the responses of a given individual depend largely on the prior responses of others, as in a conversation or behaviors on a date. Although each participant usually has interaction goals and plans about how to achieve them, immediate actions must be responsive to the behaviors of the others. Hence, people's plans are typically more flexible and contain feedback loops that allow their own actions to be guided by others' responses. Aspects of the plan (sometimes the entire plan) may have to be modified continually depending on what transpires.
In noncontingent interactions, people's responses are guided primarily by internal plans and only minimally, if at all, by other's responses, as in the cases of a performer in a play, a student delivering a speech, and a supervisor who follows a prepared text in instructing new workers about company procedures. The plans that guide behavior are often quite explicit, as in the cases of a script, speech, or musical composition, but nonetheless might contain room for some improvisation, as when a lecturer anticipates and responds to questions that arise from the audience. Actions are usually predetermined by the plan and, unless some unexpected event occurs (e.g., the audience becomes unruly), will be executed with relatively minimal responsiveness to the audience's behaviors. The actions of others serve primarily a cuing function, telling people when to execute a particular behavioral sequence, and do not serve to alter the guiding plan. Examples are a performer who waits for coperformers on stage to finish a line before giving a predetermined response or a salesperson who asks a customer a prepared question from a memorized script, knowing what the answer is likely to be but waiting for it before continuing the sales presentation.
Although the distinction between contingent and noncontingent interactions represents the extreme end-points on a continuum, it is useful in focusing on two broad classes of social anxiety. Shyness, dating anxiety, and heterosexual-social anxiety occur in contingent interactions, in which people must be continually responsive to the actions of others. In contrast, audience anxiety, stagefright, and speech anxiety occur in noncontingent interactions, in which people are performing some preplanned material before others. For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to interaction anxiety when speaking of anxiety in contingent interactions and audience anxiety when referring to anxiety in noncontingent ones (Leary, in press; Leary & Schlenker, 1981) . Buss (1980) similarly distinguishes between shyness and audience anxiety as two forms of social anxiety but does not employ the interaction contingency as a basis for the distinction.
Since both interaction and audience anxiety are conceptualized as forms of social anxiety, the same sorts of antecedents described earlier will affect both. Also, people who tend to experience one with a high frequency will tend to experience the other. In support of this statement, Buss (1980) and Leary (in press) found that responses to selfreport scales designed to tap interaction and audience anxiety were positively correlated (rs = .48 and .44, respectively).
More intensive examination of these two forms of social anxiety suggests some possible reasons why interaction and audience anxiety, although correlated, are not identical. As compared with contingent interactions, noncontingent ones (a) usually focus the attention of a larger number of people on the actor (e.g., as in a play or a class lecture), (b) are often more important, since they usually occur less frequently and often involve some sort of formal evaluation (e.g., a play will be reviewed, a class speech will be graded), (c) must be planned more thoroughly in advance (e.g., composing the speech or memorizing the lines), (d) provide people with greater structure and less ambiguity during the performance, (e) require somewhat different social skills (e.g., require less "ad lib" ability during the performance), and (f) provide people with different sorts of options for controlling how they participate (e.g., it is usually not practical for a person in a noncontingent interaction to withdraw from the stage, fade into a corner, remain silent, or so on, even though he or she might want to; these options and others exist in contingent interactions). Of course, exceptions to the above exist (e.g., some contingent interactions may be more important than some noncontingent ones), but these features seem to distinguish most examples of the two types of social settings.
Given these features, one might expect certain people to do reasonably well in one type of situation but not in the other. For instance, people who feel comfortable in structured, well-planned encounters but who worry about their ability to respond spontaneously might be anxious in contingent settings but relatively at ease in noncontingent ones. Conversely, people who prefer the spontaneity of casual conversations may do well in contingent settings but become anxious when standing as the center of attention in a noncontingent one, especially if they feel inadequately prepared for the performance. Although other examples could be cited of how the features might differentially affect anxiety, the important point is that the two types of settings place somewhat different pressures on people and require slightly different self-presentational skills. Future work might be directed at assessing the usefulness of this distinction.
Cross-cutting the contingency dimension, one can differentiate between cases where people anticipate that they are likely to have a self-presentational failure and ones where they have already had such a failure in the situation. Some event, such as a faux pas, impropriety, accident, or transgression, may occur that contradicts actors' desired identities up to that point in time and causes them to perceive that they now appear in an unsatisfactory manner. These undesired events create social predicaments and pose an immediate, concrete threat to the actor's identity (Schlenker, 1980, in press-b) . The occurrence of undesired events should induce self-attention even in people who, up to that point in time, were unconcerned about others' reactions. Further, it is a rare person who is so confident of his or her self-presentational skills as to not have some doubt about the likelihood of maintaining a preferred impression in the face of the threat. Therefore, an identity-threatening event is likely to generate some social anxiety in almost everyone.
Anxiety that arises from predicaments has been termed embarrassment or shame, depending on the nature of the event. Shame refers to the occurrence of something regrettable, dishonorable, or disgraceful, and to the feelings of guilt, incompetence, indecency, or blameworthiness that are generated. Embarrassment refers to a somewhat less potent experience that is disconcerting or flustering, causing one to feel self-conscious and ill-atease. The difference between them seems to rest on the intensity of the experience and the moral connotations. In both cases, the individual's performance has failed to meet standards. In the case of shame, however, the standards are more important to the individual (e.g., involving moral worth or decency as opposed to social or etiquette-related skills), and the failure to live up to them creates a more traumatic event that has greater ramifications for one's identity. 4 The distinction between the anticipation of self-presentational difficulties and the occurrence of a predicament has some empirical justification. As noted earlier, factor analyses of fear and anxiety inventories sometimes reveal two social anxiety factors, and the second factor invariably contains items that reflect the occurrence of predicament-creating events such as looking foolish, being criticized, making mistakes, and being misunderstood (Bates, 1971; Bernstein & Allen, 1969; Braun & Reynolds, 1969) . Such events can be said to generate anxiety that might later be labeled embarrassment or shame by the actor. At one level, though, all social anxiety can be viewed as representing concerns about predicaments, be they anticipated or actual. Indeed, people who are experiencing social anxiety in the absence of a blatant, identity-threatening event can be said to be fantasizing about potential predicaments and giving anticipatory reactions to them (Jackson & Latane, 1981; Snyder, Note 6) .
Unfortunately, there has been relatively little empirical work designed to examine similarities and differences between forms of social anxiety. The research that has been conducted has either (a) examined the properties of one of the forms by itself or (b) examined the correlation between scales that were constructed on an a priori basis to distinguish different forms of social anxiety (e.g., Buss, 1980; Leary, in press ). Thus, the forms proposed here must be viewed tentatively until more evidence is accumulated.
Implications for Counseling
As noted at the outset of this article, social anxiety constitutes a personal problem for a high percentage of the population, and a large number of people who seek professional counseling do so because they experience what they perceive to be a high degree of anxiety in certain social situations. Most of the approaches employed by practitioners who deal with socially anxious individuals may be classified into one of three modelssocial skills training, self-reevaluation techniques, and systematic desensitization-all of which have been demonstrated to be successful in particular cases (see Leary, 1982) . However, the present conceptualization suggests that all cases of chronic social anxiety do not arise for precisely the same reasons for all individuals, although the precipitating factors will always involve concerns with how one is appearing to others. Consequently, careful attention to the specific nature of a client's self-presentational concerns should enhance treatment effectiveness in counseling settings. These concerns may be divided into at least four general problem areas: (a) inadequate social skills, including not knowing the appropriate rules and rituals, (b) misperceptions of social adequacy, (c) unrealistically high standards, and (d) overconcern about interpersonal evaluations.
Social anxiety often arises from an accurately perceived social skills deficit: The individual is unable to interact effectively with others, comes across poorly in social interactions, and knows it. In these cases, skills training (e.g., Bellack & Hersen, 1979; Curran, 1977; Galassi & Galassi, 1979; Twentyman & McFall, 1975) would be the treatment of choice. Treatment might focus on either information acquisition, response acquisition, or response facilitation, depending on the extent of the client's skill deficit (Bandura, 1969; Bellack & Hersen, 1979; Curran, 1977) . Successful therapy would consist of allowing the client to acquire (e.g., through observation of models) and practice (e.g., role playing) needed social behaviors and to develop enhanced beliefs in his or her ability to interact effectively. Curran, Wallander, and Fischetti (1980) showed that socially anxious individuals can be identified on the basis of whether they actually demonstrate clear deficits in social skills that they accurately perceive or show good social skills but underestimate their social abilities. Skills training should be effective only for the former group. Those without demonstrable skill problems but who misperceive their abilities should benefit most from procedures aimed at convincing them they are socially adequate individuals who generally make good impressions on others. They may have suffered a history of unsatisfactory encounters with hypercritical friends or family, or may have otherwise come to misperceive the skills they possess. Cognitive restructuring (Kanter & Goldfriend, 1979; Malkiewich & Merluzzi, 1980) and procedures designed to modify negative self-statements (Glass, Gottman, & Shmurak, 1976; Rehm & Marston, 1968) have been shown to be effective in reducing social anxiety and enhancing interpersonal effectiveness, but should work best for this group of individuals. A number of existing procedures, including social successes under therapist supervision, vicarious experience through modeling, verbal instruction, and so forth, seem effective in increasing perceptions of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) .
A related problem occurs when people set unrealistically high personal standards for assessing social performance, so that they seldom feel satisfied with their interpersonal behavior or how they are regarded by others, even when they recognize that they are receiving approval (Bandura, 1969) . Here, therapy should be aimed at repudiating the unrealistic standards and substituting more manageable ones.
Other socially anxious individuals may experience problems because they are overconcerned with how they are regarded by others. People who are high in the need for approval or the fear of negative evaluation, for example, may simply be too motivated to make a favorable impression on others. They may be motivated to impress nearly everyone with whom they interact, including others whose evaluations should (objectively) cause them little concern, or they may be overly motivated to impress particular audiences because they overestimate the effect of their behaviors on others' reactions (e.g., "She'll hate me tonight if I'm not an absolutely charming date") or the importance of others' reactions for their own lives (e.g., "I'll just die if he doesn't like me"). Ellis and Harper (1975) suggested that the belief that one must obtain love and approval from others is one of the primary irrational ideas that interferes with anxiety-free living. One aim of rational emotive therapy is to lead the client to relinguish dire needs for social approval and forego the goal of obtaining acceptance for its own sake. Such an approach may be especially effective for socially anxious clients who are overly motivated to make favorable impressions.
In sum, although we propose that all instances of social anxiety arise from self-presentational concerns, a wide variety of situational and dispositional factors may precipitate such concerns for different individuals. Therapists should carefully examine clients' typical modes of interaction, their sophistication in appreciating the rules of social interaction, their perceptions of how they are regarded, their standards, and the types of situations that typically produce anxiety for them in order to elucidate the nature of the self-presentational problem. Treatment can then be tailored. The hypothesis that treatments for social anxiety should be matched to the locus of the specific self-presentational problem in order to achieve maximal effectiveness warrants future investigation.
Summary
We have proposed that social anxiety is a construct applied to describe a constellation of cognitive and affective experiences that result from the prospect of interpersonal evaluation in real or imagined social situations. Associated with it are a variety of reactions, including withdrawal (either physical or cognitive), feelings of inferiority, selfpreoccupation, and reduced self-monitoring and control.
Social anxiety indicates a perceived threat to the identities of those who experience it, since it reflects concerns about how they are regarded in social life. As such, it is a manifestation of a perceived self-presentational problem. Socially anxious individuals do not perceive themselves capable of controlling, in the fashion they desire, the impression-rel-evant reactions of others. Their impressionrelevant outcome expectancies are low, and they perceive a discrepancy between their standards and their social performances or outcomes. Social anxiety occurs in real or imagined social situations when people are motivated to make a particular impression on others but doubt they will do so.
Situational, dispositional, and audience factors that affect the motivation to impress others and the likelihood of doing so affect social anxiety. Individual differences in social anxiousness are proposed to arise from personal characteristics of individuals that influence the degree to which they are motivated to impress others and perceive self-presentational difficulties. Further, once people have labeled themselves as "socially anxious" they become more likely to exhibit anxiety across a wide range of social situations.
The self-presentation approach to social anxiety provides an integrative conceptual view of the phenomenon by adopting a social-psychological perspective, one that roots the genesis of the experience in the social interaction process itself. The approach specifies both the antecedents of the experience and the behavioral responses to self-presentational concerns and is consistent with the existing research on anxiety in general and social anxiety in particular. In addition, the approach contains numerous implications for counseling situations, especially the recommendation that treatments be tailored to the specific type of self-presentational problem encountered by people seeking help.
